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This Special Issue combines commentary on very specific
problems of the modern administrative state with an analysis of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") over its fifty-year life. The discussions by Professors Sunstein and Viscusi of "risk-risk" or "health-health"
issues-the possibility that a regulation aimed at improving
health may actually increase net health risks-may seem far
removed from Professor Strauss's treatment of the broader issue
of preserving the APA's relevance for the next half-century. But
the relatively specific discussions help to inform the broader one.
If risk-risk issues are in any way typical of problems unforeseen
by the APA's drafters but now important, their nature may shed
light on the kinds of interpretation of the APA that will best
accommodate innovation. After a brief look at Professor
McGarity's outline of possible positions on the future of the regulatory state, I shall address the risk-risk discussions. I shall then
turn to Professor Strauss's analysis and consider what one can
reasonably demand of interpretation of a statute such as the
APA.

t Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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I. A TAXONOMY OF ATTIUDES TOWARD THE REGULATORY STATE
Professor McGarity sorts various attitudes toward the modern administrative state into five categories--"radical anti-interventionists," "free marketeers," "modern mugwumps," "good government reinventionists," and "unrepentant protectionists." As I
understand the piece, McGarity does not claim that each category
has some fundamental inherent logic, such that a person is guilty
of self-contradiction if he finds himself a free marketeer on one
issue but, say, a good government reinventionist on another.
Such a strong reading of the taxonomy would not, I think, be
convincing. For example, McGarity places in the unrepentant
protectionist box both observers who would object to marketmimicking pollution control devices such as effluent charges, and
ones who would object to the "symbolic message" conveyed by an
antidiscrimination regime with marketable "rights to discriminate."' It seems to me, however, that a reasonable person might
view the symbolic messages differently in the two cases. There
appears to be a fairly broad social consensus that some pollution
is not merely inevitable but justifiable, in the sense that at some
point the incremental costs of pollution control exceed any incremental gain. If so, then market-mimicking devices may well
represent a practical means of getting the biggest bang (in pollution reduction) for the buck (in pollution control costs). But the
social consensus on, say, racial discrimination is quite different-a view that it is an evil, to be extinguished altogether. In
this context, marketable discrimination rights seem to create a
cognitive dissonance that would tend to thwart the stated goals
of government intervention. Thus, if McGarity were claiming that
every observer must fit herself tidily into only one of his five
boxes, I would have to say that the claim is unproven.
Although McGarity does not expressly advocate any of the
named schools of thought, he becomes increasingly generous as
he moves along from radical anti-interventionists to unrepentant
protectionists. According to McGarity, the former are said to
believe that the "best gauge of the health of a country's political
economy is how well it treats the rich."' From this, a reader
might infer that these people were inverted Rawlsians, favoring
corporate welfare policies and anything else that grinds the faces

1 Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory
State, 63 U Chi L Rev 1463, 1514-15 (1996).

2 Id at 1491.
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of the poor in the interests of redistribution to the rich. The supporting citation, though not entirely clear, seems to address a
different question-whether society in general, and the rich
themselves, view the rich as "merely rich or also [as] bearers of
wealth."3 I take it that the source here, George Gilder,4 is suggesting only that a society is likely to be better off if its members
broadly recognize that earning large sums of money, or even
enjoying large investment returns, is not ipso facto reprehensible,
but in fact may well be part of a positive-sum game, from which
those who interact with the rich may benefit.
By contrast, when McGarity turns to good government
reinventionists and unrepentant protectionists, we find more
benign portrayals. Good government reinventionists, for example,
"recognize that governmental solutions require large and complex
bureaucracies,"5 and "recognize that government sets the rules of
the marketplace and that government intervention may be justified on fairness, equity, or other grounds apart from broken markets."6 Unrepentant protectionists are still more perspicacious.
They have "[real world stories" that "belie the benign reassurances of the free marketeers."7 They have "a healthy respect for
uncertainty."' To the supposed "obvious" (!) assertion of unnamed persons that "equal opportunity, environmental, and consumer protection laws have been on the books for at least two
decades without achieving significant success" at reducing the
degree of invidious discrimination, environmental degradation
and consumer fraud, they have "at least three responses,"' none
of which is evidently subject to any flaw worth mentioning. As
McGarity does not explicitly advocate any particular position, it
seems best to take him at his word; to do otherwise would be to
argue with what is presented as a system of cataloging.

II. RISK-RISK, HEALTH-HEALTH ANALYSES
Sunstein and Viscusi both offer sophisticated accounts of the
risk-risk problem, Sunstein stressing institutional concerns and
Viscusi the more purely analytical substantive issues. Sunstein

3 Id at

1491 n 130.

See George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty 50 (Basic Books 1981).
5 McGarity, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1507-10 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
6 Id at 1509 (emphasis added).
7 Id at 1518.
8 Id at 1520.
9 Id at 1514.
4
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asks why risk-risk (or health-health) tradeoffs seem to be more
palatable than "attend[ing] to the overall gains from regulation
and to the overall losses from regulation"'--that is, some kind
of cost-benefit analysis. 1 But at least at a high enough level of
generality, it seems hardly controversial that government should
avoid acts that do more harm than good.' Sunstein's suggestion
that people may find tradeoffs between health and other goods
peculiarly incommensurable does not strike me as convincing.'
People make these tradeoffs every day in their individual lives,
when they trade the risks of a little extra speed for added convenience, or nutritional risks for flavor delights, or cancer and cardiovascular hazards for the psychic and other rewards of
smoking. And while he is undoubtedly right to observe that "reduction of mortality and morbidity effects to dollars can erase
qualitative distinctions among diverse risks,"'4 it need not do so.
Nothing in the basic idea of cost-benefit analysis compels disregard of pain and suffering, or of the number of years of life likely
to be saved, or even, for that matter, of the fault or innocence of
the persons whose life expectancies may be prolonged. Whatever
the explanation for the hostility to cost-benefit analysis, however,
it seems irrefutable that general utilitarian tradeoffs encounter
greater resistance than does the balancing of pure health-health
risks.
Health-health analysis has a critical implication that
Sunstein overlooks. Agencies engaged in risk assessment have
commonly adopted "conservative" assumptions, ones that take
the chance of overestimating rather than underestimating the
target risk, on the theory that the prime importance of human
health and life justifies such a tilt-better to be safe than sorry.
Of course a technical response to this is to say that the tilt is
better done openly, after the most likely risk has been calculated,
when the agency makes the policy decision on how far to go toward its reduction. 5 But before health-health issues came to the
10 Cass R. Sunstein, Health-HealthTradeoffs, 63 U Chi L Rev 1533, 1549-50 (1996).

The qualifier "some kind" is important. Sunstein is surely right that people would
reasonably object to any analysis that "erase[di important qualitative distinctions among
[ ] risks." Id at 1551. A death accompanied by prolonged suffering, inflicted on a wholly
involuntary youthful victim, is hardly the same as a painless death suffered by a nonagenarian as a result of conduct chosen quite unnecessarily and with ample warning of its

hazards.
"
'4

Id at 1562.
See id at 1551-52.
Id at 1551 (emphasis added).
Compare International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement
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fore, the basic substantive critique of this sort of conservatism-that it risked undue sacrifice of other values-necessarily
implicated the controversy over, and hostility toward, cost-benefit
analysis.
Health-health analysis tends to undermine the assumption
that it is better to chance exaggerating than underestimating a
risk. If one cannot know a priori that more stringent regulations
(the presumptive consequence of overestimating a risk) mean
more health on a net basis, a preference for health and safety
over other values, however sound, seems simply irrelevant to risk
estimation. If the agency ratchets up the remedy in reliance on
exaggerated estimates of the target risk, but the remedy itself
inflicts health costs, there is no assurance that the added severity
is advancing health on a net basis. In many cases, of course, a
quick eyeballing of the situation may reveal that the health hazards of stringent regulation are trivial. The need to inquire into
health-health issues should, as Sunstein suggests, itself be subject to some sort of cost-benefit analysis, in which the costs of
further inquiry are balanced against the potential advantages."i
And the statute may have barred the agency from considering
any but the target risk.'7 But, once the possibility of healthhealth issues is admitted, ritual bows to the primacy of health
are exposed as unresponsive to the criticism of "conservative"
assumptions.
Viscusi addresses some of the economic analysis of healthhealth issues, including a regulation's possible tendency to create
health risks through its economic impact. Here the issue is neither cost-benefit relationships nor direct health-health effects,
such as the way in which restrictions on the use of a substance
may drive people to use still more hazardous substitutes or may
lull them into riskier behavior. Instead, Viscusi identifies two
types of indirect health-health impacts-the health costs of the
economic activity engendered by the restriction itself' (the "economic activity" effect) and the health costs caused by diversion of

Workers v Pendergrass,878 F2d 389, 394-95 (DC Cir 1989) (because of agency authority to
exercise a policy preference to err on the side of greater risk reduction, its choice of
maximum likelihood estimate over upper confidence limit for calculations would be
permissible in principle).
6 See Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1552-53 (cited in note 10). See also Gas Appliance
Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v Department of Energy, 998 F2d 1041, 1047 (DC Cir 1993) (applying
such a balancing test to agency's lack of research).
, See Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1555 (cited in note 10).
,S See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U Chi L Rev 1423, 1451 (1996).
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resources to compliance with the regulation and thus away from
other health-improving expenditures, such as ones on health care
and on more healthy food, cars, and housing (the "mortality-income" effect). 9
The economic activity effect may well exist, but Viscusi's
statement of it seems misleading. If the health costs of $1 billion
of average economic activity are $35 million (seven fatalities
using Viscusi's numbers, or some combination of fatalities and
lesser injuries), it does not follow that one could impute such
health costs to any particular regulation costing $1 billion to
implement. Indeed, I would expect regulation-induced anti-risk
measures to leave overall economic activity (the economy's pure
macro numbers) largely unchanged; the regulation would draw
land, labor, and capital toward the regulatory compliance activity
and away from other uses. Of course the composition of economic
activity would change, with possible health implications. Thus, if
the regulation shifted activity from manufacturing to construction, an activity that produces more fatalities per worker, 0 that
shift would increase the fatality rate. But a shift in the opposite
direction would have beneficial health effects. In any event, however feasible it may be to identify the distribution of the new,
induced activities, it will surely be hard to predict the activities
from which resources will be diverted. After all, the diversion will
arise from a combination of the regulation's (1) dampening economic activity (other than, obviously, compliance costs) in the
regulated field, because its goods or services will be more costly,
and (2) luring resources from other activities as the new demand
for safety causes outward movement along the supply curve for
inputs to the extra safety. It would take quite an econometrician
to produce convincing estimates of how much each of the "other
activities" would decline. Thus the net economic activity effect
seems likely to prove elusive.
Viscusi's calculations of mortality-income effects, spelled out
elsewhere in some detail,2 ' rest on two aspects of consumer behavior: (1) their willingness to spend money on extra health, in
terms of dollars per statistical death or injury averted (the "price"
of health), and (2) the proportion of added income that they are

9 Id at 1452-53.
21

See W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of

Expenditures,8 J Risk & Uncertainty 19, 32 (1994).
21 W. Mip Viscusi, Mortality effects of regulatory costs and policy evaluation criteria,
25 RAND J Econ 94 (1994).
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willing to allocate to health (the marginal propensity to consume
health). As to the first, rational and well informed persons would
presumably allocate their expenditures on health so as to equalize the health return in all areas, for example, health care expenditures as such, income sacrificed in return for reductions in
hazards in the workplace, and health characteristics of products
(more crashworthy cars, for example). Thus, as I understand
Viscusi's reasoning, we may infer from workers' insistence on
premiums for risky work that imply, for example, a value-of-life
of $5 million, that additional expenditures on health are likely to
be made at the same rate of exchange. Then, if the marginal
propensity to spend on health is 0.1, $50 million in income foregone would imply $5 million in reduced health spending and,
thus, the loss of one statistical life.
I am certainly not qualified to evaluate Viscusi's analysis
here. On one side, it may underestimate the serendipitous contributions that wealth makes to health; even a person buying a
heavier car purely for comfort, for example, will benefit from the
greater safety that (everything else being equal) the car will
provide. But other methods for quantifying wealth's contribution
to health are clearly tricky, despite the strong statistical association noted by both Sunstein and Viscusi. Causation works both
ways (health generates wealth as well as the reverse, as good
health enables people to earn more), and both health and wealth
may in part be attributable to common causes, such as education
or intelligence. Given these difficulties, Viscusi's method of
quantification may be the best that we are likely to see for a long
time.

III. KEEPING THE APA UP TO DATE
Professor Strauss invites us to look at changing modes of
interpreting the APA over time and also to think of ways to keep
it responsive to changing times. He sketches out three eras of
interpretation. In the first he sees the Supreme Court applying a
method associated with Hart and Sacks's The Legal Process,2 2
seeking to give effect to the APA's purposes where "the evils it
was aimed at appear." 3 Legislative history serves to identify the
problems that the framers sought to resolve, so as to assure in-

' Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process:Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law (Foundation 1994).
Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U Chi L Rev 1389, 13991400 (1996), quoting Wong Yang Sung v McGrath, 339 US 33, 40-41 (1950).
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terpretations that actually solve those problems. For the second
(or "middle") period, Strauss depicts a freewheeling approach,
characterized by a readiness "to reinterpret the text to fit contemporary developments."2 4 Using as his prime example the
briefing and opinion in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations,Inc. v Camp,2 5 Strauss says that the "contemporary trend [I] teased out of recent statutes and developments and
perhaps the courts' own preferences, shaped choice within the
range that.., the 'terms of the Act warrant. ' "2 6 In Strauss's
third era, the present, we find an interpretive technique likely to
"transform[ ] the APA into a much more time-bound statute than
it has thus far been."2 7 He points to Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs v Greenwich Collieries, Inc.,8 where
the Court interpreted the term "burden of proof," as used in §
7(c),2" on the basis of its "ordinary meaning" on the date of enactment in 1946.30
The reader is left in little doubt that Strauss views the first
two phases of interpretation as sound, and the third as unsound.
The first two differ mainly in that the Court's expectations of
enlightenment from the legislative history were understandably
greater in the first phase. The problems arising under the statute
were more likely to be ones that concerned the framers, so their
explanations were more presumptively apt to resolve those problems. By contrast with the healthy problem-solving mode of the
first two eras, Strauss depicts the current phase as one in which
the Court has turned "from a stance of cooperation with the work
of Congress to one of distant detachment," a change "profoundly
destabilizing to the legal order.""' Greenwich Collieries at least
superficially supports Professor Strauss's belief that the current
method of interpretation may be destabilizing, as the decision-finding "burden of proof" to mean burden of persuasion
rather than merely burden of coming forward--evidently had the
effect of overturning about sixty-five years of settled practice

24 Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1393 (cited in note 23).
25
"

397 US 150 (1970).
Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1405 (cited in note 23) (emphasis and internal citation

omitted).
See id at 1413.
114 S Ct 2251 (1994).
29 5 USC § 556(d) (1994).
' Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1416-17 (cited in note 23).
3, Id at 1421.
28
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under the Longshoreman and Harborworkers Compensation Act."2
Before trying to address the issue of modernization generally, let's first have a look at Data Processing, Professor Strauss's
example of interpretation in the middle era, when assumptions
and findings of the framers were less likely to be deemed informative than in the early days, but still before the onset of the
current alleged sclerosis. Strauss singles out as characteristic of
the Court's opinion its reliance on "trend": "Where statutes are
concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people
who may protest administrative action."33 The Court's argument-and I think Strauss has fairly captured it-is somewhat
astonishing. The implicit premise appears to be that, once a
trend has been identified, it is the courts' duty to keep it rolling.
But almost any trend involves not just a steady accretion of some
costless good, but also some sacrifice of other goods, a sacrifice
either deemed appropriate by some decision maker or rendered
inevitable by some social evolution. If the trend arises from the
conscious decision of a select group of persons (Data Processing
points almost exclusively to decisions of the Court itself), then
one supposes that the decision makers (unless driven by some
controlling statute) have thought that the goods secured by each
step in the trend outweighed the goods sacrificed, perhaps because over time the value of the goods sacrificed had depreciated,
or that of the goods secured had risen. In the case of standing,
the tradeoff is not especially obscure. The good of some citizens'
increased ability to hold agencies accountable to Congress is
obtained at the cost of increased litigation (with its attendant
expense and delay) and, more importantly, a shift of interpretive
power and agenda-setting discretion from a politically responsible
executive branch to a life-tenured judiciary. Although cabined by
the many doctrines of deference and nonreviewability, the shift,
and the costs incurred by DataProcessing'strend, are quite real.
To see a trend thus tells us little. The question is how far it
should go. Where Congress has addressed itself to the issue, the
congressional answer would seem dispositive in the absence of
some constitutional override, which no one suggests was present
in Data Processing. It seems from Professor Strauss's account
that the language, context, and legislative history of the provision interpreted in Data Processing, § 10(a) of the APA,' point-

Id at 1418-20.
Id at 1405, quoting Data Processing,397 US at 154.
3 5 USC § 702 (1994).
"
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ed generally (though not conclusively) toward the narrower of the
two readings proposed-that is, to an understanding that in the
absence of a specific statute allowing suit by a "person aggrieved," mere competitive injury was not enough.3 5 Yet, as he
notes, the Court skipped all that. Instead, it relied on a trend
largely of its own creation and refrained from any discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of pushing the trend forward
another notch.
Data Processingunderscores that a consciously modernizing
interpretation tends to leave the instrument being interpreted
back in the dust. Even if the Data Processing Court had condescended to share with the public some clue about its view of the
goods that the decision necessarily traded off, there would be a
question about why such tradeoffs should enter the Court's analysis. One answer might be that the congressional language was
driven by such a tradeoff, with the Court's mission being to read
the statutory terms in light of the likely congressional concern
and evaluation of the competing goods. Assuming that answer,
the next question would be whether the courts are to make their
own evaluation or to take the balance implicit in Congress's initial decision. Even if the courts are to make their own evaluation,
is this to evolve steadily over time? Given Congress's frequent
involvement in the matter through specific statutes providing for
review, as well as the questionable ability of the courts to make
the necessary tradeoffs, I don't see any clear basis for inferring a
congressional intent to launch the courts on such a mission.
But Professor Strauss is of course right that statutory obsolescence is a problem. His recent article On Resegregating the
Worlds of Statute and Common Law3" makes the point particularly effectively in the context of administrative agencies' organic
statutes, where loose judicial interpretations (ones allowing the
agency considerable latitude) tend to facilitate accommodation of
new realities.37 By reading linguistic ambiguities for all they are
reasonably worth and deferring to any administrative interpretation that falls within the resulting range, the courts can allow politically responsive actors, not bound by stare decisis, to fit the
statute to the times. This seems to me a basic message, perhaps
the basic message, of Chevron.38

Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1404 (cited in note 23).
1994 S Ct Rev 429.
Id at 486-527.
Chevron v NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984). Richard Pierce lays out in grim detail the
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But the Chevron solution is unavailable for the APA; there is
no agency to which its interpretation has beeai delegated. (Deference to individual agencies in APA interpretations would thwart
its apparent purpose to serve as a charter governing procedures
across agencies.) Can it then be kept up to date only by the (literally) "trendy" approach of Data Processing? Before trying to answer that question I will step back a minute and ask more generally what the consuming public might reasonably expect from
courts in their interpretation of a statute such as the
APA-intended to guide the procedures of countless arms of the
administrative state.
Congress's decision to adopt the APA expressed, presumably,
its belief that the courts-and perhaps the citizenry-needed
some help. If Congress had fully embraced the judicial answers to
the questions posed by administrative proliferation, a statute
would not have been necessary. I apologize for mentioning the
obvious, but anxiety over obsolescence tends to obscure the point.
Absent constitutional imperatives, the congressional voice is
decisive. Thus, to state the obvious, one criterion for sound interpretation of the APA must be fidelity to what Congress meant.
A second criterion is that interpretations should lend themselves to reasonable application across the range of agencies and
agency activities governed by the statute. For example, a very
demanding view of § 3(a)(2)'s requirement that an agency make
its decisions "available for public inspection," 9 well suited to the
Social Security Administration with offices scattered over the
country and tens of millions of clients, might be quite unsuitable
for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. If one size must
fit all, as in some sense it must under the APA, then those who
define the permissible size must either build flexibility into the
definition (for example, "reasonable" availability) or find some
other solution to the problem of variability. As applied to Greenwich Collieries, this principle might support reading "burden of
proof" as burden of production only. Because that reading leaves
the more significant issue, burden of persuasion, untouched, it
enables individual agencies to resolve it separately with a focus
on context.

consequences of judicial insistence on rigid narrow meanings in his account of the Maislin
decision and its sequel. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court'sNew Hypertextualism:
An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum L Rev
749, 766-76 (1995).
* 5 USC § 552(aX2) (1994).
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Notice that each of these approaches to agency diversity has
its costs. A pliable standard provides relatively little advance
guidance. But a clear universal standard, deliberately set in lax
terms (ones that leave agencies relatively unconstrained), may
jeopardize private interests that Congress meant to protect.
Third, there is surely an interest-the one that Strauss singles out for emphasis-in interpretations that fit current circumstances. Congress's provision that in a formal hearing any "oral
or documentary evidence may be received," subject to the
agency's power to exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence,"" should doubtless be construed in a way that
recognizes the advantages (and hazards) of information on a disk,
or at least in a way that allows agencies to adjust to changing
technology. Further, in some contexts, later congressional enactments or other exogenous developments might change background assumptions strongly enough to shift the meaning of an
APA term. As Justice Scalia noted over a decade ago, the extraordinary and largely unexpected shift of agency policy-making from
the adjudicative to the rule-making format, coupled with relaxed
ripeness standards and new congressional requirements of timely
challenges to administrative rules, goes some way toward
explaining the courts' perhaps surprisingly demanding reading of
§ 4's requirement that the agency accompany final rules with "a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose."4 ' The
framers would perhaps be startled by the modern "concise" statement-commonly dozens of folio pages of minute print. But "concise" is a relative term. If an agency is imposing a vast set of
complex requirements in a single rule making, it may take quite
a few words to explain their "basis and purpose," even concisely.
And the courts have never insisted on prolixity.42 As the mandate of § 4 is quite elastic, and the Court had already found that,
in some cases, disclosure of agency reasoning was essential to substantive judicial review,' the stretch here is modest.
While Strauss focuses on keeping the APA current, I wonder
if the central fault of Greenwich Collieries, by his lights, is really
the Court's asserted failure to allow the meaning of the APA to

5 USC § 556(d) (1994).
5 USC § 553(c) (1994). See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 S Ct Rev 345, 375-81.
42 Compare Greater Boston Television Corp v FCC, 444 F2d 841, 852 (DC Cir 1970)
41

(drawing the line between the "intolerably mute" and the "tolerably terse" in the context
of inadequately explained shifts of policy).
' SEC v Chenery Corp, 318 US 80, 93-95 (1943).
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flow with the times. To be sure, its interpretive technique showed
no interest in keeping current. Yet Strauss's most powerful argument against the Court's reading is its conflict with the historic
(sixty-five-year-old) understanding of the Longshoreman and
Harborworkers Compensation Act." That conflict became inevitable in 1972, when legislative changes brought hearings under
the Longshoreman Act within the APA's requirements for an onthe-record hearing, and the difficulty would have arisen just as
sharply if those changes had occurred in 1952, or even a month
after adoption of the APA. Strauss's real complaint-still a serious one-lies in regard to the second criterion that I hypothesized for APA interpretation, namely, the need to embrace disparate agencies and disparate activities. On that criterion, none of
the options open to the Court was particularly appetizing, except
for one altogether independent of the APA, which I discuss below.
The Court could not adopt an elastic interpretation such as might
be embodied in a concept of "reasonableness." It had to decide
between two discrete possibilities, burden of production or burden
of persuasion; Congress surely could not have meant the term to
shift its meaning back and forth, from agency to agency, at the
will of the courts. So long as the Court was forced to choose a
one-size-fits-all meaning, the option with the advantage of being
less intrusive upon agency choice (mere burden of production)
came at the price of allowing agencies to deny some private parties the benefit of forcing their adversaries to carry the burden of
persuasion-a benefit Congress intended them to have if the
Court's reading of Congress's 1946 meaning was correct.
As it turns out, the issue of across-agency applicability was
not all that acute in Greenwich Collieries. As Strauss notes, the
Longshoreman Act authorized the Secretary of Labor to establish
exceptions by regulation, 45 but the Court found that he had not
exercised that power. 46 The Secretary's clear power to deviate
from the APA seems to reflect Congress's recognition that the
Longshoreman Act involved special values. Because the Secretary
could protect those values regardless of the Court's construction
of the APA, the case was hardly the strongest for seeking out a
meaning in the APA that would allow agencies to accommodate
their specific concerns.

Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1414-15 (cited in note 23).
4' 30 USC § 932(a) (1994).
4 Greenwich Collieries, 114 S Ct at 2254-55.
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What of the health-health issues discussed by Professors
Sunstein and Viscusi? So far as appears, these were wholly unanticipated by the APA's framers. More broadly, they seem to exhibit characteristics quite distinct from the concerns of 1946. The
issues appear at the intersection of different disciplines (natural
sciences and economics) and raise problems for coordinating
across different agencies. For example, the issue of whether to
require that children under two have their own airplane seats
involves first the technical question of what contribution the seat
requirement may make to safety, second the impact of that requirement on travellers' choice between air and its alternatives
(mainly automobile), and finally the safety of the other means of
travel. A sensible resolution (to the extent permitted by statute)
requires the agency to blend the lessons of science and economics
and (perhaps) to seek coordination with other agencies; at a minimum, one would hope that the agency would not regulate air
travel on the basis of false assumptions about conditions in other
transportation modes. So far as I know, the APA has thrown no
roadblocks in the way of interdisciplinary and interagency cooperation. Indeed, in Sierra Club v Costle,47 the D.C. Circuit construed the more stringent procedural demands of the Clean Air
Act to allow relatively free communications within the executive
branch in the course of a rule making. Even in the context of
that specialized statute, the court was alert to avoid Procrustean
solutions to the extent congressional language left the matter
open. That approach, driven by the doctors' maxim that one
should above all avoid doing harm, may be more effective than a
self-conscious quest for up-to-date readings of the APA.

47 657 F2d 298, 404-08 (DC Cir 1981).

